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Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: time to 
sound a global alert?
The epidemic of Ebola virus disease in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the second largest in 
history after the 2014 west African epidemic. A storm 
of detrimental factors complicates this event: armed 
conflict, political instability, and mass displacement. 
WHO, the DRC Government, and non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) partners have shown remarkable 
leadership but are badly stretched. The outbreak remains 
far from controlled, risking a long-term epidemic with 
regional, perhaps global, impacts.
Faced with an evolving complex humanitarian crisis, 
and recent elections complete, WHO Director-General 
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus should reconvene the 
Emergency Committee (EC) and consider declaring 
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern 
(PHEIC). The first EC report on Oct 17, 2018, called for 
“intensified” action, fearing “significant deterioration”.1 
The EC’s fears have been prescient. Cases of Ebola virus 
disease have more than tripled, with an expanded 
geographical footprint into 18 health zones.2 
Governments, including the USA, have withdrawn 
personnel, fearing for their safety.3
Effective mitigation requires case identification. 
Yet less than 20% of new Ebola cases have been on 
known contact lists.4 This situation undercuts vital 
interventions, such as contact investigations, isolation, 
and safe burials. WHO might have to shift from ring 
vaccination to vaccination based on geographical 
location, but doing so effectively will require far 
more doses; limited vaccine supplies, therefore, are 
concerning.5
The risk of cross-border spread of Ebola virus disease 
to Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan is high.2 Tens of 
thousands of Congolese cross borders daily to trade, 
to visit family, or for funerals. Roads to Kigali and 
Kampala are well travelled and could facilitate Ebola 
transfer to large population centres. Uganda and 
Rwanda have fairly strong surveillance systems and are 
preparing for cross-border spread. Uganda vaccinated 
essential health workers and is reportedly screening 
all travellers at Entebbe airport.6 Yet cases could be 
missed at the border. South Sudan, meanwhile, is 
among the world’s most fragile states. A widening 
epidemic of Ebola virus disease could destabilise the 
region and disrupt the tenuous peace in South Sudan, 
where violence continues and famine is predicted.7 
In the past 6 months, 300 000 DRC refugees have 
crossed into Uganda, adding to a refugee population 
of about 1 million.8 The west African epidemic of 
Ebola virus disease in 2014–16 reduced regional 
economies by US$2·8 billion.9 Similar impact in 
DRC and neighbouring countries could devastate 
fragile economies.
The legal criteria for a PHEIC have been met. The 
International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) empower 
the WHO Director-General to declare a PHEIC. A PHEIC is 
an extraordinary event with public health risk to other 
countries that requires a coordinated international 
response.10 IHR criteria include public health impact, 
novelty and scale, and movement of persons.10 The 
WHO Director-General must also consider health risks, 
potential international spread, and EC guidance, among 
other factors.
The report of the EC in October, 2018, expressed 
concern about armed conflict and new cases without 
known links, but advised against a PHEIC “at this 
time”.1 Unlike past statements, the EC did not say “the 
conditions for a PHEIC have not been met”. The DRC 
epidemic meets PHEIC criteria and has for some time. 
The IHR empower a PHEIC for “potential” cross-border 
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transmission, without waiting until international spread 
has occurred. The Ebola epidemic in DRC is unfolding 
amid regional conflict, as attacks on medical staff 
coincide with subsequent spikes in cases.11
We call upon the WHO Director-General to reconvene 
the EC to review the grounds for a PHEIC declaration. He 
should invite states, the UN, and NGOs to attend and 
submit evidence.10 The United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO), UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, 
and civil society could provide critical information. The 
EC should recommend proactive measures on health, 
diplomacy, security, and community engagement. 
Concrete recommendations could specify the level and 
kind of resources needed and composition of security 
and diplomatic assets.
A PHEIC is a clarion call to galvanise high-level political, 
financial, and technical support. A PHEIC would provide 
a clear signal from the world’s global health body that 
UN leadership is urgent. A PHEIC also empowers the 
WHO Director-General to make temporary, non-binding 
recommendations that have normative force.10
The IHR do not specify any surge in authority or 
financing when declaring a PHEIC. In the past, states 
did not heed WHO warnings that travel and trade 
restrictions are harmful. During the west African Ebola 
epidemic, 58 states restricted travel from affected areas, 
and during the 2009 influenza A H1N1 pandemic, states 
imposed trade and travel restrictions.12–14
Trade or travel barriers in the DRC would have 
devastating impacts. WHO, with UN support, should 
take active steps to prevent unlawful and harmful 
restrictions. In 2009, WHO and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) criticised governments that took 
non-evidence-based actions; going forward, WHO and 
WTO could publicly name non-compliant countries. 
Governments should also agree to dispute resolution, 
including binding IHR arbitration.10
If a PHEIC escalated conflict by raising the profile of the 
international response, it would be deeply concerning. 
Recent elections in DRC were clouded by concerns about 
vote-rigging, unsettling lines of power and legitimacy. 
Armed groups have used violence to generate chaos. 
A PHEIC could increase incentives to target Ebola 
responders to gain leverage. As in South Sudan, armed 
groups could manipulate aid for non-humanitarian 
purposes.15 Like any complex multilateral negotiation, 
cultural competence and smart diplomacy are required. 
Outsiders are unlikely to be privy to all on-the-ground 
realities and risks.
The IHR were designed to respond to a health 
emergency like the DRC Ebola epidemic. We urge the 
WHO Director-General to reconvene the EC and re-assess 
the declaration of a PHEIC. The UN and governments 
should increase support for WHO and partners. If the 
IHR fails, or worse, increases political instability, it will 
require urgent reform.
State non-compliance should not obscure the value 
of the IHR in establishing norms of rapid identification, 
notification, and response. The IHR require states to 
develop health-system capacities, assessed by WHO’s 
Joint External Evaluation. IHR reform should focus on 
technical and financial assistance for national health 
capacities. A PHEIC should trigger surge capacity in 
relation to authority and finances, with effective 
mechanisms to gain state compliance.
WHO has shown leadership and operational 
endurance, working tirelessly to combat the DRC Ebola 
epidemic. But WHO and partners cannot succeed alone. 
We live at a political moment when international 
solutions to collective threats are increasingly hard to 
achieve. But WHO and the UN system will be called upon 
with ever-greater frequency in the future to manage 
complex humanitarian crises. We must plan for a future 
in which political violence and instability become the 
new abnormal.
*Lawrence Gostin, Alexandra Phelan, 
Alex Godwin Coutinho, Mark Eccleston-Turner, 
Ngozi Erondu, Oyebanji Filani, Tom Inglesby, Rebecca Katz, 
Allan Maleche, Jennifer B Nuzzo, Oyewale Tomori, 
Matthew Kavanagh
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center, Washington, DC 20001, USA (LG, MK); 
Center for Global Health Science and Security & Law Center, 
Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA (AP); University of 
Global Health Equity, Kigali, Rwanda (AGC); School of Law, Keele 
University, Newcastle-under-Lyme, UK (ME-T); Chatham House, 
London, UK (NE); Federal Ministry of Health, Abuja, Nigeria (OF); 
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, USA (TI, JBN); 
Georgetown Center for Global Health Science and Security, 
Washington, DC, USA (RK); Kenya Legal and Ethical Issues 
Network on HIV & AIDS, Nairobi, Kenya (AM); and Nigerian 
Academy of Science, Lagos, Nigeria (OT) 
gostin@georgetown.edu
Comment
www.thelancet.com   Published online February 4, 2019   http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30243-0 3
AGC, NE, OF, TI, RK, AM, JBN, OT, and MK declare no competing interests. LG is 
Director of the WHO Collaborating Center on National and Global Health Law, 
and is on the IHR Roster of Experts. AP previously worked as a consultant to the 
WHO on unrelated matters in 2017 and earlier. ME-T worked as a paid consultant 
to the WHO Working Group on Influenza Vaccine Supply Hubs during 2018.
1 WHO. Statement on the October 2018 meeting of the IHR Emergency 
Committee on the Ebola virus disease outbreak in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. Oct 17, 2018. http://www.who.int/news-room/detail/17-10-
2018-statement-on-the-meeting-of-the-ihr-emergency-committee-on-
the-ebola-outbreak-in-drc (accessed Jan 25, 2019).
2 WHO. Ebola virus disease—Democratic Republic of the Congo External 
Situation Report 25: update. Jan 23, 2019. https://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/handle/10665/279811/SITREP_EVD_DRC_20190123-eng.pdf 
(accessed Jan 29, 2019).
3 Gostin LO, Kavanagh MM, Cameron E. Ebola and war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo: avoiding failure and thinking ahead. JAMA 2019; 
321: 243–44.
4 Nuzzo JB, Inglesby TB. Ramping up the response to Ebola. N Engl J Med 
2018; 379: 2490–91.
5 Kelland K. As Ebola threatens mega-cities, vaccine stockpile needs grow. 
Reuters, Dec 20, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-ebola-
stockpile/as-ebola-threatens-mega-cities-vaccine-stockpile-needs-grow-
idUSKCN1OJ21B (accessed Jan 18, 2019).
6 The Observer (Kampala). WHO orders mandatory Ebola screening at 
Entebbe airport. The Observer (Kampala), Jan 14, 2019. https://allafrica.
com/stories/201901140542.html (accessed Jan 16, 2019).
7 Kuol L. Why South Sudan faces collapse if peace pact fails—again. 
The Conversation, Nov 8, 2018. https://theconversation.com/why-south-
sudan-faces-collapse-if-peace-pact-fails-again-106188 
(accessed Jan 25, 2019).
8 UNHCR, Operational Portal. DRC situation. Data as of 31 December 2018. 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/drc (accessed Jan 25, 2019).
9 World Bank. 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola crisis: impact update. 2016. 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/macroeconomics/publication/2014-
2015-west-africa-ebola-crisis-impact-update (accessed Jan 14, 2019).
10 WHO. International Health Regulations 2005 (third edition). Geneva: 
World Health Organization, 2005.
11 Morrison JS, Devermont J. North Kivu’s Ebola outbreak at day 90. Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. Nov 1, 2018. https://www.csis.org/
analysis/north-kivus-ebola-outbreak-day-90-what-be-done (accessed 
Jan 30, 2019).
12 Tejpar A, Hoffman SJ. Canada’s violation of international law during the 
2014–16 Ebola outbreak. Canadian Yearbook Int Law 2017; 54: 366–68.
13 Nuzzo JB, Cicero AJ, Waldhorn R, Inglesby TV. Travel bans will increase the 
damage wrought by Ebola. Biosecur Bioterror 2014; 12: 306–09.
14 Gostin LO, DeBartolo MC, Katz R. The global health law trilogy: towards a 
safer, healthier, and fairer world. Lancet 2017; 390: 1918–26.
15 Yayboke E. Accessing South Sudan: humanitarian aid in a time of crisis. 
CSIS Briefs, Nov 27, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/accessing-south-
sudan-humanitarian-aid-time-crisis (accessed Jan 25, 2019).
